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THE DEBT CRISIS  of the developing  countries  is now entering  its fifth  year. 
Since August 1982, when Mexico declared its inability to service its 
debts, more than  forty developing  countries  have experienced  crises in 
external  finance.1  Several earlier  Brookings  studies analyzing  the debt 
crisis have focused on the origins  of the crisis, the market  responses to 
it, and the relationship  of the industrialized  nations' macroeconomic 
policies to the prospects  of the debtor  nationis.2  This  paper  has a different 
focus: the management  of the debt crisis by the creditor  governments, 
especially the United States. 
Looking  back at the past four years, one can discern  a basic strategy 
on the part  of the United  States, Japan,  and  other  creditor  governments. 
For them, the debt crisis opened up the prospect of a major world 
financial  crisis. With  the  world's  largest  commercial  banks  holding  claims 
on the debtor  countries  that  typically  exceed 100  percent  of bank  capital, 
1. The World  Bank's  study  "Development  and  Debt Service:  Dilemma  of the 1980s," 
table 2, page xiv, in World  Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing  Countries,  1985-86 
ed. (World  Bank, 1986),  lists thirty-eight  countries  that  have engaged  in multilateral  debt 
renegotiations  during  1982-85. Several more countries  that have entered IMF standby 
arrangements  because  of debt-servicing  difficulties  have not engaged  in multilateral  debt 
renegotiations.  The  countries  in  the World  Bank  list  are  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Central 
African  Republic,  Chile, Costa  Rica, Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  Equatorial  Guinea, 
Guyana, Honduras,  Ivory Coast, Jamaica,  Liberia, Madagascar,  Malawi, Mauritania, 
Mexico, Morocco,  Mozambique,  Nicaragua,  Niger, Nigeria,  Panama,  Peru,  Philippines, 
Romania,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone, Somalia,  Sudan,  Togo, Uganda,  Uruguay,  Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia,  Zaire,  Zambia. 
2.  See Carlos  F. Diaz-Alejandro,  "Some Aspects of the 1982-83  Brazilian  Payments 
Crisis,  " BPEA,  2:1983,  pp.  515-42; Diaz-Alejandro,  "Latin  American  Debt:  I Don't  Think 
We Are in Kansas  Anymore,"  BPEA, 2:1984,  pp. 335-89; Jeffrey  D. Sachs, "External 
Debt  and  Macroeconomic  Performance  in Latin  America  and  East Asia," BPEA,  2:1985, 
pp. 523-64; and Rudiger  Dornbusch, "Policy and Performance  Links between LDC 
Debtors  and  Industrial  Nations," BPEA,  2:1985,  pp. 303-56. 
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any wholesale  repudiation  of debt  by the leading  debtor  countries  would 
threaten  the solvency of these banks  and push the world economy into 
treacherous  and uncharted  waters. The strategy  of the creditor  govern- 
ments therefore coalesced around  one principal  goal: maintaining  the 
servicing  of commercial  bank  claims  by the debtor  governments. 
Most foreign and economic policy initiatives on the debt by the 
creditor governments and the multilateral  institutions have been de- 
signed with that objective at the core. The creditor  governments  have 
used their  leverage  to make sure that  reschedulings  of bank  debts owed 
by foreign governments involve neither an interruption  of  interest 
payments  to the banks  nor  a reduction  in the present  value of the debtor 
countries'  future  obligations  to the banks.  In effect, the creditor  govern- 
ments have endorsed  debt reschedulings  rather  than debt relief, where 
relief signifies any arrangement,  such as below-market  interest rates, 
forgiveness  of principal,  or repurchase  of debts  by the debtor  country  at 
below par, that reduces the present value of contractual  obligations  of 
the debtor country. Although banks have written down the value of 
some sovereign  loans on their own books, sometimes at the behest of 
regulators  or auditors,  they have not granted  relief  to the debtor  govern- 
ments.3  Write-downs  are an internal  matter;  relief is a matter  between 
creditors  and  debtors. 
The private banks have sometimes been encouraged by creditor 
governments  to make new loans, but in amounts  significantly  less than 
the interest  that they receive from  the debtor  countries.  The new loans 
have almost always been conditioned on an agreement between the 
country  and the International  Monetary  Fund on a high-conditionality 
standby  loan, under  which the debtor  government  declares  its intent  to 
pursue  austerity  measures. Finally, various official  lenders have made 
new loans, some of which have also been conditioned  on policy reforms 
in the debtor countries. The creditor governments have sometimes 
extended new loans to the major  debtor countries (as with a "bridge" 
loan to Mexico in the fall of 1986)  to enable them to service their bank 
debts. 
3. In some cases, explicit  relief has been granted  to private  borrowers  in the debtor 
countries,  usually  when  the loan  involves a single  bank  and  a single  borrower.  However, 
with  respect  to private-sector  loans,  the  commercial  banks  have  repeatedly  pressed  foreign 
governments  to take  over  or at least  guarantee  the private-sector  debts  on an  ex post  basis, 
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The strategy has so far succeeded in keeping the foreign debts 
serviced, as is evident from data in table 1 on the net resource  transfer 
to the debtor countries during  the past five years. Since 1982, the net 
transfer-the net flow of new capital  into the debtor  countries  minus  the 
repayment of interest and profits on foreign investment-has  been 
negative  because the debtors  have paid  back much  more  than  they have 
received in new loans. For Latin America, the negative net resource 
transfer  since 1982  has totaled  more  than  $95  billion.  Yet the years  under 
the debt crisis and IMF-style austerity programs  have been ones of 
extreme  economic  hardship  and  declining  living  standards  in most of the 
debtor  countries.  In some of the worst cases, the declines are shocking, 
with 1985  real  wage levels down  to 50 or  75 percent  of 1975  values. Social 
and  political  dislocations  have been profound. 
Since the onset of the debt crisis, there have been several waves of 
optimism and pessimism in the creditor countries as to whether the 
fundamental  debt strategy  would succeed. Some of the economic indi- 
cators prompting  these swings in mood are shown in table 2. After the 
jolt of Mexico's financial  distress in mid-1982,  the immediate  concern 
was whether  the debtor  countries  would simply renounce  their obliga- 
tions. Creditors  were thus delighted  with the events of 1983,  when the 
major debtor countries chose to maintain  debt servicing despite an 
extreme fiscal crisis and plummeting  economic activity. Creditors  ap- 
plauded  the sharp  swings  towards  trade  balance  surplus  and  argued  that 
the accompanying  sharp  fall in gross national  product  in those countries 
was unavoidable  but temporary.  As seen in the table, among  the group 
of countries  with debt servicing  problems,  real per capita  GDP in 1983 
fell by 4.8 percent,  while  the trade  balance  swung  from  a $6 billion  deficit 
in 1982  to a $22 billion surplus  in 1983.  In the western hemisphere,  the 
fall in real per capita  GDP was more than 5 percent. Creditor  optimism 
increased  in 1984  when the world  economic recovery, led by the United 
States, accelerated.  The major  debtor  countries  experienced  per capita 
growth once again (though  African  per capita GDP continued  to fall), 
albeit at a modest rate, and their terms of trade improved. Creditors 
talked as though the debt crisis were behind them, and they began 
reaching  for long-term  solutions through  multiyear  rescheduling  agree- 
ments  with the major  debtor  countries. 
The optimism  was shattered  in 1985.  The news from  the countries  of 
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Table 1.  Net Resource Transfers to Latin America, 1981-85 
Billions  of dollars 
Interest 
Net  repayments  Net 
capital  -  and foreign  =  resource 
Year  inflow  profits  transfer 
1981  49.1  27.8  21.3 
1982  27.6  36.8  -9.2 
1983  6.1  34.9  -  28.8 
1984  11.6  37.1  -  25.5 
1985a  4.1  36.7  -  32.6 
Source:  Inter-American  Development  Bank,  Economic  and  Social  Progress  in  Latin  America,  1986  Report 
(Washington,  D.C.:  IDB,  1986), table 111-8, p. 35. 
a.  Preliminary. 
Table  2. Economic  Indicators  of the Debtor  Countries,  1981-86 
Annual  percent  change  unless otherwise  indicated 
Indicator  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986a 
Countries  with debt- 
servicing problems 
Per capita  real GDP  -  1.0  -2.5  -4.8  0.2  0.6  -0.5 
Trade  balance  (billions 
of dollars)  -  19.4  -6.0  22.0  34.6  35.4  24.2 
Terms  of tradeb  -2.8  -4.8  - 2.8  2.7  - 2.5  - 5.8 
Export  volume  -3.0  -4.2  5.4  7.0  1.4  0.6 
Debt-export  ratio (percent)  180.2  234.5  252.3  244.2  260.6  275.4 
Western hemisphere 
Per capita  real GDP  -  1.2  -3.2  -5.3  0.8  1.7  -0.6 
Trade  balance  (billions 
of dollars)  - 3.2  7.2  28.7  37.0  33.6  26.9 
Terms  of tradeb  -4.4  - 5.8  - 2.8  4.0  - 3.0  - 5.1 
Export  volume  6.1  -2.2  7.1  7.3  -  1.2  -0.2 
Debt-export  ratio (percent)  208.8  267.2  287.5  273.3  295.0  311.1 
Sub-Saharan  Africa 
Per capita  real GDP  -  1.2  -2.8  -2.8  -  1.4  0.9  2.4 
Trade  balance  (billions 
of dollars)  -4.5  -3.9  -  1.6  0.6  0.1  -0.7 
Terms  of tradeb  - 7.3  - 6.5  1.2  5.0  - 2.0  -  1.9 
Export  volume  -2.6  4.4  0.4  4.9  0.7  9.1 
Debt-export  ratio (percent)  169.3  201.3  215.8  216.3  240.3  236.0 
Source:  International Monetary Fund,  World Economic  Outlook (IMF,  April 1986). 
a.  Preliminary. 
b.  Terms of trade measure the price of exports  relative to the price of imports. Jeffrey Sachs  401 
adequate:  continued  industrial  country  growth,  a fall in the U.S. dollar, 
and a drop in interest  rates. Nevertheless, the debtor  countries  experi- 
enced a fall in their dollar export prices, a sharp deceleration in the 
growth  of export  volumes, and  therefore  a drop  in dollar  export  earnings 
for the year. Coming  against  a backdrop  of acceptable  OECD  economic 
performance,  and after several years of debtor country austerity, that 
outcome was highly unsettling. Although, according  to the table, per 
capita output in Latin America grew slightly, the aggregate  figure is 
deceptive. Output  in Brazil, the largest of the major  debtor countries, 
grew  rapidly,  while real  per capita  GDP  growth  was negative  on average 
for the other  major  debtors  of Latin  America. 
For the first  time since the onset of the crisis, the poor performance 
of the debtor countries  in 1985  could not be blamed  on either external 
conditions or internal.  profligacy.  Commercial  banks further  restricted 
their exposure to the indebted countries of Latin America and Africa 
during  the year, as can be seen in table  3 (from  mid-1984  to March  1986, 
exposure for the nine major U.S.  banks fell by $1.6 billion in Latin 
America). So far, 1986 has been even worse for most of the heavily 
indebted  countries  in Latin  America  and  Africa.  Real  commodities  prices 
have continued  to fall, bank  lending  has been stagnant,  and  the forecast 
is for negative  per capita  growth  for much of Latin  America  and Africa 
for 1986  and 1987. 
In October 1985, in reaction to the unfavorable  events of that year, 
U.S. Secretary  of the Treasury  James A. Baker III offered a plan that 
acknowledged  that the debtor countries  were not rebounding  from the 
crisis of the early 1980s  as had been forecast. But the methods of the 
Baker  plan were merely  an intensification  of earlier  procedures.  Under 
the plan, the commercial  banks were encouraged  to make new loans to 
the heavily indebted countries, specifically $20 billion of increased 
exposure over three years, while the multilateral  lending institutions 
were called upon to make $9 billion of new loans in return  for policy 
adjustments  in the debtor  countries.  The  debtor  countries  were expected 
to continue to meet huge interest obligations  on a timely basis. Latin 
American debtors, for example, have obligations projected at $94.6 
billion  for 1986-88.4  The Baker  plan was significant  not as a new policy 
4. The forecast is by Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), in the Latin American  Review 
(Lexington,  Mass.:  DRI, Summer  1986),  table  3, p. 6. 402  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
departure,  but rather  as an admission  by the United States that  the debt 
strategy  up to 1985  had not generated  adequate  economic growth  in the 
debtor  economies. 
While  the creditors  have ridden  waves of optimism  and  pessimism  in 
the past five years, many observers and policymakers  in the debtor 
countries have seen the story more simply as one of fairly continuous 
decline. With the exception of a mediocre  year in 1984,  they have had 
little to cheer about. Critics of the creditor  governments'  current  ap- 
proach argue that the failure of the debtor countries to prosper is not 
surprising  in view of the collapse of investments  there  and  in view of the 
political  and  economic uncertainties  that  result  from  the heavy external 
debt burden. They point out that among the countries that have been 
forced to reschedule  their debts in the past decade, there are almost no 
success stories of countries  that have pursued  IMF austerity  measures 
and World  Bank structural  adjustments  to reestablish  creditworthiness 
and restore economic growth. As table 4 shows, all but one of the 
countries that rescheduled their bank debts between 1978 and 1981, 
before the onset of the global debt crisis, have languished  with slow 
growth  and  without  access to the international  capital  markets.  The only 
notable  case of success is Turkey,  whose turnaround  after  a debt crisis 
in the late 1970s  was, as I argue  later, materially  assisted by an inflow  of 
Table 3.  Exposure of Nine Major U.S.  Banks in the Debtor Countries, Various Periods, 
1982-1986a 
Billions  of dollars unless  otherwise  specified 
Region  End-1982  Mid-1984  March 1986 
Total Exposure 
All LDCs  83.4  84.0  75.6 
Latin America  51.2  53.8  52.2 
Africa  5.6  4.9  3.6 
Exposure  as percent 
of bank capital 
All LDCs  287.7  246.3  173.3 
Latin America  176.5  157.8  119.6 
Africa  19.3  14.3  8.1 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council,  "Country Exposure  Lending Survey."  Mid-1984 data 
from statistical  release  of October  15, 1984; March 1986 data from release  of August  1, 1986. 
a.  Exposures  are  total  amounts  owed  to  U.S.  banks  after adjustments  for guarantees  and external  borrowing. 
Total  exposures  are  calculated  for  all  LDCs  (OPEC,  Nonoil  Latin  America,  Nonoil  Asia,  Nonoil  Africa);  Latin 
America (Nonoil  Latin America plus Ecuador and Venezuela);  and Africa (Nonoil  Africa plus Algeria, Gabon, Libya, 
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some $5 billion in new official loans during 1978-82-far  more than 
anything  available  today.5 
Dissatisfaction  among  creditor  nations  with the current  debt  arrange- 
ments has grown sharply  in the past year. Peru has made a break  with 
the system by declaring  unilaterally  its intention  to limit  debt servicing 
to 10  percent  of exports. Powerful  opposition  groups  within  Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and many other countries are pressing for 
similar  policy initiatives  from their governments.  In response, Senator 
Bill Bradley  of New Jersey has broken  new political  ground  by offering 
a plan  for managing  the debt crisis that is based on debt forgiveness  by 
Table 4.  Debt Reschedulings and Economic Indicators, 1978-86 
Percent  change 
in per capita 
real GDP 
between first  Access  to 
First  rescheduling  capital  markets 
rescheduling  and 1985  Later reschedulings  in 1986 
1978 
Peru  -13.0  1980, 1983, 1984  No 
Jamaica  -  14.3  1981, 1984, 1985  No 
1979 
Turkey  9.4  1981, 1982  Yes 
1980 
Togo  -21.0a  1983  No 
Zaire  _5.8b  1983, 1984, 1985  No 
Bolivia  -28.2  1981  No 
Nicaragua  -13.1  1981, 1982, 1984  No 
1981 
Madagascar  n.a.  1982, 1983, 1984  No 
Sudan  n.a.  1982, 1983, 1984, 1985  No 
Sources:  Per capita real GDP from IMF, International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues,  and unpublished IMF 
data.  Rescheduling  dates  from  Maxwell  Watson  and  others,  Intertnational Capital  Markets:  Developments  and 
Prospects,  Occasional  Paper 43 (IMF,  February  1986). 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Until  1983. 
b.  Until  1984. 
5. Recently,  Brazil,  the black  sheep  of 1984,  has  been  touted  as the  great  success story 
of 1986,  in view of its rapid  economic growth  for the past two years. But Brazil is an 
example  of a country  that  has explicitly  rejected  participation  in standard  IMF  programs. 
Its current  growth  is fueled  by large  budget  deficits,  a rapidly  growing  internal  debt, a huge 
black market  premium  on the exchange rate, and price controls, as well as favorable 
external  conditions,  such  as falling  interest  rates  and  a terms  of trade  improvement.  Thus, 
the sustainability  of Brazil's  miniboom  is open to doubt,  and the "lessons" of Brazil  for 
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the commercial  banks rather  than debt rescheduling  and full interest 
servicing. The Bradley plan would maintain  the current  case-by-case 
approach, conditioning  debt relief on economic policy reforms. The 
exact nature  of relief would be subject to negotiation,  but an example 
might  be a yearly  package  of 3 percentage  points  of interest  rate  relief, 3 
percent forgiveness of principal,  and $3 billion in new loans from the 
multilateral  lenders.6 
In view of the problems  attendant  upon the current  debt strategy, I 
propose six principles  as part  of a new approach  to be put in its place: 
-debt  relief should play a role in a new comprehensive  strategy  of 
debt management; 
-debt  relief  can and  must  be applied  selectively, limiting  relief  to the 
countries  most in need; 
-selective  debt relief would not threaten  the international  financial 
system, since the bank debt of most countries is far too small to pose 
any systemic risk, while many  of the largest  debtors, such as Brazil  and 
South Korea, do not need, and  probably  would not seek, debt relief; 
-even  where debt relief is not a desirable option, other financial 
arrangements  can and should be found to increase the net transfer  of 
resources  to the debtor  countries; 
-many  of the current  risks to the debtor  countries  should  be shifted 
back to the world financial  markets  by encouraging  multiyear  resched- 
uling  agreements,  explicit  interest  capitalization,  and  contingency  clauses 
linking  capital  flows to the terms  of trade; 
as in the current  arrangements,  the financial  restructurings  should 
be carried  out  on a case-by-case  basis, in  conjunction  with  internationally 
supervised  programs  of policy reform  in the debtor  countries. 
Debt relief is necessary as a safety valve for countries that are 
collapsing  under  the debt  burden.  It makes  little sense to argue  that  relief 
is unwise  because "on average"  the debtor  countries  may  be recovering 
or because the largest  debtors might  not need relief. There are dozens 
6.  Senator  Bradley's  proposal  is notable  both for shifting  the political  debate in the 
United  States  (Bradley  is the first  major  U.S. politician  to endorse  a program  of relief)  and 
for linking  debt negotiations  with trade  talks. There  have been several  earlier  proposals 
for relief, following  the pioneering  proposal  in 1983  of Professor  Peter Kenen  for a new 
public  institution  to repurchase  LDC debt at a discount  from  the commercial  banks. See 
Peter  B. Kenen, "A Bailout  Plan  for the Banks," New York  Times,  March  6, 1983.  For 
Senator  Bradley's  plan,  see "A Proposal  for Third  World  Debt Management,"  presented 
at the Congressional  Summit  on Exchange  Rates, Zurich,  Switzerland,  June  29, 1986. Jeffrey Sachs  405 
of countries struggling  now under the debt burden, and some are not 
making  it. Peru is a case in point. The Peruvian  economy is in a deep 
depression, and its terms of trade, already falling, are projected to 
plummet 14 percent in 1986. Per capita gross domestic product has 
declined  by about 15 percent since 1980,  and real wages have declined 
by an estimated  40 percent. The social fabric  is crumbling.  Murder  and 
terrorism  are the daily fare of Lima. President  Garcia's  announcement 
last year  of a unilateral  suspension  of debt repayments  was a true cri du 
coeur. The response  from  the creditors  has been to prove  that  he cannot 
get away with it. 
For countries, such as Peru, that have suffered  very large drops in 
living standards,  out-and-out  debt relief is now warranted.  As a modifi- 
cation to Senator  Bradley's  proposal, which seems to make debt relief 
available  to all debtors, I develop a proposal  in which objective indica- 
tors, such as a country's  decline in real per capita  output  over a period 
of several years, are used to trigger  debt relief on a selective basis. 
Selectivity  is important  both  to protect  the financial  system  and  to reduce 
the moral  hazards  that would be present  with the unconditional  availa- 
bility  of debt relief. 
For countries that are performing  poorly, but not so poorly as to 
require  debt  relief,  the debt  servicing  burden  should  be eased by methods 
that compromise  between rescheduling  and forgiveness. One realistic 
possibility  is to move away from the current  system, in which only the 
existing  creditors  are called upon to make new loans, towards  a system 
in which new lenders  are also enabled  to enter, by granting  their  claims 
seniority relative to the existing creditors. International  agreements 
could  be reached  to provide  that  the new  loans  will  be serviced  in  entirety 
before  any  of the  existing  debt  is serviced.  In  some  cases such  agreements 
would require  a rewriting  of existing loan covenants. An attraction  of 
such an approach is that it would promote a capital inflow into the 
country  without  necessitating  a definitive  decision on the need for debt 
forgiveness.  The current  bank  creditors  would  be fully repaid  only if the 
debtor  country  in fact grows fast enough  to service both the new debt, 
which  has priority,  and  the old. Otherwise,  some part  of the debts of the 
existing  creditors  will have to be forgiven  at some point. Other  mecha- 
nisms for promoting  new investments  should also be introduced.  Both 
swaps  of debt  for equity  and  rescheduling  arrangements  that  are contin- 
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with Mexico, are now being tentatively tried, but should be greatly 
expanded  in coverage. As in most debt  workouts,  the ultimate  solutions 
will surely  be messy and filled  with "ad hockery." It is clear, however, 
that  bolder  approaches  are now needed. 
Strategy in the Debt Crisis 
Although it is sometimes asserted that official creditors and bank 
creditors  have been treated  equally  in the management  of the debt  crisis, 
in the past five years the commercial  banks have received large net 
transfers  from  the debtor  countries,  while  the official  creditors,  including 
the creditor  governments  and the multilateral  institutions,  have made 
large  net  transfers  to the  debtor  countries.  Operationally,  it can  be argued 
that  the official  creditors  are indeed "bailing  out the banks." 
As can be seen from  table 5, large  positive net transfers  of resources 
from the private creditors (mostly banks) to  the major borrowing 
countries  came to a quick  halt  during  1982;  the transfers  turned  negative 
during 1983, significantly negative during 1984. At the same time, 
resource transfers from the official creditors have continued to be 
positive, though  not as large  as the net transfers  to the private  creditors. 
Even in Sub-Saharan  Africa in  1984, negative transfers to private 
creditors  were larger  than positive net transfers  from official sources. 
While comprehensive  World  Bank data for 1985  are not yet available, 
there is little doubt  that the diverging  trend  between private  and official 
creditors  widened substantially.  One of the important  reasons for the 
differing  pattern  of resource transfers  is that the official  creditors  have 
rescheduled  interest  payments  through  the Paris  Club,  the international 
forum for rescheduling service on debt granted by official bilateral 
creditors,  while of course the commercial  banks  have not. 
Creditor  government  policies have further  supported  the commercial 
banks  through  their  decisions in the area  of bank  supervision.  The most 
important  decision in this area has been that of the U.S.  banking 
regulators  to allow  the commercial  banks  to hold  almost  all of their  LDC 
debt on their books at face value, and to count each dollar  of interest 
receipts as a dollar of income, despite the fact that a large part of the 
interest  receipts is made  possible through  fresh, "involuntary"  lending 
by the same banks  (involuntary  in the sense that  each individual  bank  is 
forced  to increase  exposure  on a pro rata  basis). Jeffrey Sachs  407 
The creditor  strategy  has successfully  avoided  an international  bank- 
ing crisis. The commercial  banks have not only continued to receive 
interest servicing  from most of the debtor  countries, but enjoyed large 
net resource transfers  during  1984  and 1985. It appears  that the banks 
have been able to reduce their absolute exposure levels in the debtor 
countries  mainly  by calling  in their  claims  on private-sector  debtors  at a 
greater  rate than they have made concerted loans to the governments. 
For example, between mid-1984  and March 1986, bank loans in Latin 
America  to nonbank  official  entities rose by $4.5 billion, while loans to 
banks  and  private  nonbank  borrowers  fell by $6.1 billion.7 
One of the deep ironies of the current situation is that while the 
creditor strategy is applied to all debtor countries, the banking  risks 
result from only a few countries and apply to only a few banks, as 
evidenced  in table  6. While  the nine major  banks  in the United States do 
have  about 100  percent  of capital  locked  up  in  Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico, 
Table  5. Net Resource  Transfers  to Debtor  Countries,  1981-84 
Billions  of dollars 
Category  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Major debtor countries 
Official creditors  5.7  5.4  1.5  4.6 
Private  creditors  4.8  1.0  -  1.8  -  10.0 
Latin America 
Official  creditors  2.6  3.0  1.8  3.2 
Private  creditors  4.0  0.4  - 3.5  -  10.9 
Sub-Saharan  Africa 
Official  creditors  3.3  3.2  3.3  2.0 
Private  creditors  1.7  2.6  1.8  -2.1 
Source: World Bank,  World Debt  Tables: External Debt of Developing  Countries,  1985-86 ed. (World Bank,  1986). 
For World Bank country classifications,  see  pp. xliii-xlv. 
7. The  data  are  from  the  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council,  "Country 
Exposure  Lending  Survey:  October  15, 1984,  and  August  1, 1986,"  table  II, which  divides 
the debtors  by category:  banks,  public  borrowers,  and  private  nonbank  borrowers.  There 
are, unfortunately,  several  problems  with interpreting  the data on falling  exposures  and 
on the shifts between public-  and private-sector  debtors. First, a small  and undisclosed 
part  of the decline in exposure is due to write-offs  of debt rather  than amortizations  of 
debt. Second, part of the shift to public-sector  borrowers  reflects not new concerted 
lending,  but rather  an ex post shift of existing  debt from  the private  sector to the public 
sector through  a variety  of schemes in which private-sector  debt has been absorbed  by 
governments.  The  most  important  interpretation  of the data,  however,  is probably  the one 
offered  in the text: concerted  lending  has covered public-sector  debt only, so that the 
private  sector  has been  forced  to amortize  loans without  any way to obtain  new lending. 408  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
and Venezuela, the exposure of other U.S.  banks to these countries 
represents  only 35 percent of capital. For Latin America as a whole, 
bank  exposure is 120  percent of capital  for major  U.S. banks, but only 
43 percent of capital  for other banks. Indeed, all LDC debt is only 61 
percent  of bank  capital  for the others. 
Table 6 puts to rest the myth that the U.S. banks  could not afford  to 
grant  widespread  debt relief. With  just a modicum  of selectivity, debt 
relief  could be easily absorbed  by the banks. Suppose,  for example, that 
debt relief comes in the form of five years of zero interest payments, 
with the missed payments  forgiven  rather  than  capitalized.  Assuming  a 
market  interest  rate  of 7 percent  during  the five-year  interval,  such relief 
has a present value of $0.31 per dollar of debt.8 Suppose further  that 
such  relief  is granted  to all  but  the three  largest  debtors-Brazil, Mexico, 
and Venezuela-of  the individual  countries in crisis shown in table 6. 
The cost of such relief would be only 15 percent of bank  capital  for the 
major  U.S. banks  and  5 percent  of bank  capital  for all other  U.S. banks. 
If  the relief  were  also extended  to include  Brazil,  Mexico, and  Venezuela, 
the cost would  rise to 41 percent  of bank  capital  for the major  banks  and 
14  percent  for the rest. Later  in the  paper  I suggest  a criterion  for  granting 
relief  that  further  reduces  the costs. 
Why the Debtors Do Not Repudiate 
The creditor  strategy  has so far been notably  less successful for the 
debtor  countries  than  it has been for the banks. Real living standards  in 
the debtor  countries  have declined  sharply  since the early 1980s  in many 
countries, and further  declines are in prospect  for 1986.  Table 7 shows 
the declines in per capita real GDP for the debtor countries in Latin 
America since 1981. Unfortunately,  as striking  as these declines are, 
they have not contributed  much towards the goal of improved  credit- 
worthiness, since, as shown in table 8, debt-export  ratios throughout 
Latin  America  are, with the exception  of Brazil,  higher  in 1985  than  they 
were in 1982. The GDP declines, furthermore,  understate  the overall 
declines in living  standards  in most countries,  since in addition  to falling 
output  per capita  most of these economies have also suffered  significant 
8.  Calculated as 0.07 + 0.07/(1.07)  + 0.07/(1.07)2 + 0.07/(1.07)3 + 0.07/(1.07)4 = 0.31. Jeffrey Sachs  409 
declines in their terms of trade. In most of the debtor countries, real 
wages have plummeted.  In Peru, for example, real wages in 1985  were 
49 percent  of their  level a decade before;  in Uruguay,  64 percent;  and  in 
Mexico, 74 percent.9 
Table 6.  Exposure of U.S.  Banks to the Debtor Countries, March 1986a 
Nine major  banks  All other  banks 
Percent  of  Percent  of 
Billions  of  Percent  of  loans to  Billions  of  Percent  of  loans to 
Region and country  dollars  capital  LDCs  dollars  capital  LDCs 
All LDCs  75.6  173.3  100.0  40.3  61.0  100.0 
Latin America  52.2  119.6  69.0  28.4  43.0  70.5 
Africa  3.6  8.1  4.8  1.0  1.7  2.5 
Brazil  16.0  36.7  21.2  7.7  11.6  19.1 
Mexico  13.8  31.6  18.3  10.4  15.8  25.8 
Venezuela  6.9  15.8  9.1  2.8  4.2  8.4 
Argentina  6.0  13.9  7.9  2.5  3.7  6.2 
Chile  4.0  9.1  5.3  2.3  3.5  5.7 
Philippines  3.6  8.3  4.8  1.4  2.1  3.5 
Yugoslavia  1.3  3.0  1.7  0.7  1.1  1.7 
Ecuador  1.2  2.8  1.6  0.8  1.1  2.0 
Peru  0.8  1.8  1.1  0.6  0.9  1.5 
Uruguay  0.7  1.6  0.9  0.2  0.3  0.5 
Panama  0.7  1.6  0.9  0.3  0.5  0.7 
Nigeria  0.6  1.5  0.8  0.2  0.3  0.5 
Morocco  0.6  1.4  0.8  0.2  0.3  0.5 
Ivory Coast  0.3  0.7  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.2 
Dominican  Republic  0.3  0.7  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.2 
Costa Rica  0.2  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.5 
Jamaica  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Romania  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0 
Zambia  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Honduras  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0 
Malawi  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Liberia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Senegal  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Nicaragua  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0 
Sudan  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Zaire  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Source:  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council,  "Country  Exposure  Lending  Survey:  August  1, 1986." 
a. Exposures  are total amounts  owed to U.S. banks  after adjustments  for guarantees  and external  borrowings. 
Total exposures  are calculated  for all LDCs (OPEC,  Nonoil Latin America,  Nonoil Asia, Nonoil Africa);  Latin 
America  (Nonoil  Latin  America  plus  Ecuador  and  Venezuela);  and  Africa  (Nonoil  Africa  plus  Algeria,  Gabon,  Libya, 
and  Nigeria).  The list of individual  countries  is not all-inclusive  and  therefore  does not sum  to the total  for all LDCs. 
Figures  are rounded. 
9. See United  Nations, Economic  Commission  for Latin  America  and  the Caribbean, 
"The  Economic  Crisis:  Policies  for  Adjustment,  Stabilization,  and  Growth"  (Mexico  City: 
April  1986),  table 16,  p. 108. 410  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
Why, then, have the debtor  countries  continued  to pay their debts? 
In the  1930s, in a  similar economic situation, almost every Latin 
American  government  unilaterally  suspended servicing  on its external 
bond obligations. So far, only Peru has broken ranks and unilaterally 
reduced debt payments. Some other countries have fallen into deep 
arrears,  but  have continued  to bargain  with  the commercial  banks  on the 
basis of a resumption  of interest servicing. Most countries  have in fact 
continued  to make  their  interest  payments. 
The major  difference  between the 1930s  and the 1980s  appears  to lie 
in the absence of a "hegemonic" power in the 1930s, a role that the 
United States fills in the 1980s. As Charles Kindleberger  has amply 
documented,  none of the creditor  governments  in the 1930s  was willing 
or able to provide the public goods needed to preserve the economic 
order.  10  Without  a lender  of last resort and an enforcer  of international 
contractual  obligations,  the debtor  countries  chose to default  and gen- 
erally faced only mild sanctions in response. Only in rare cases did 
Table 7.  Changes in Per Capita Real GDP, Latin America, 1981-85 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Country  change 
Argentina  -  18.5 
Bolivia  - 28.4 
Brazil  - 2.0 
Chile  - 8.7 
Colombia  -0.1 
Costa Rica  -  11.2 
Ecuador  - 3.9 
El Salvador  - 24.0 
Guatemala  -  18.3 
Jamaica  -  2.2a 
Mexico  -4.3 
Panama  0.7 
Peru  -  14.8 
Uruguay  -  18.6 
Venezuela  - 21.6 
Source: United Nations Economic  Commission  for Latin America  and the Caribbean,  "The Economic  Crisis: 
Policies  for Adjustment,  Stabilization,  and  Growth"  (Mexico  City:  April  1986). 
a.  To  1984. 
10.  C  P. Kindleberger,  The World in Depression,  1929-39  (University  of California 
Press, 1986). Jeffrey Sachs  411 
creditor  governments  force debtor  countries  to continue  to service their 
debts. 
In the 1980s, the United States has managed  the debt crisis with a 
view toward maintaining  continued commercial  bank debt servicing. 
Under the U.S.  aegis, the other creditor governments  and, through 
them, the multilateral  institutions  have supported  that basic strategy. 
The ability  of the banks  to enforce their  loan agreements  has rested not 
only  on their  own  bargainingpower,  but  also, crucially,  on  the  willingness 
of the U.S. government  to back them up at critical  junctures. With  the 
creditor  governments  placing  so much  emphasis  on continued  servicing 
of bank debts, a decision by a country  unilaterally  to suspend  its debt 
repayments  is as much  a foreign  policy decision as a financial  one. 
Countries  that might happily break with the commercial  banks are 
loath to break  with the rest of the international  system. Retaliation  by 
the  banks  would  involve  no more  than  a cutoff  of new  loans, a withdrawal 
of trade credits, and possible seizure of some assets of the debtor 
government  held  in the creditor  countries.  But breaking  official  ties with 
creditor  governments  would  involve such  crucial  financial  and  nonfinan- 
cial areas as aid, trade policy, technology licensing, and arms deals. 
Moreover,  as Carlos  Diaz-Alejandro  pointed  out, defaults  could  let loose 
political  passions  that  would  threaten  the debtor  government  itself: "For 
a while, the leader  may  bask  in nationalist  glory,  but  the  forces unleashed 
by default, especially an active one, may threaten  constitutional  order 
and could reopen the gates to populist-nationalistic  authoritarian  gen- 
erals-after all, the nation  would be surrounded  by enemies."  " 
Table 8.  Debt-Export Ratios, Latin America, 1981-85 
Percent 
Country  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Argentina  333.4  447.3  458.6  489.7  509.0 
Brazil  277.5  356.8  376.7  330.8  348.6 
Chile  276.8  332.8  361.2  399.7  414.5 
Colombia  150.1  183.0  243.1  248.2  245.9 
Ecuador  198.2  232.7  259.5  243.4  254.1 
Mexico  243.3  304.1  323.6  291.5  326.9 
Peru  229.4  270.9  323.8  335.0  368.1 
Venezuela  118.4  154.5  197.9  171.7  181.2 
Source: Data Resources,  Inc.,  Latin American Review  (Lexington,  Mass: DRI, Summer  1986). 
11. Diaz-Alejandro,  "The Latin  American  Debt Crisis,"  p. 381. 412  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
The creditor  governments  have also been reinforced  by the interna- 
tional  financial  and  development  institutions.  The  IMF  routinely  requires 
that  countries  come to terms  with their  creditor  banks  as a condition  for 
an IMF program.  In most cases an agreement  in principle  between the 
debtor and the banks is a precondition  for an IMF loan; in others the 
IMF  program  is approved  on the basis of a likely agreement  and may be 
suspended  if agreement  is not reached. While the IMF generally  does 
not specify the terms that an agreement  must follow, the commercial 
banks know that they can afford  to hold out for full interest servicing, 
with a rescheduling  of principal. 
Without  an IMF  program,  the country  typically  cannot  reschedule  its 
debts with official  export  credit  agencies of the creditor  governments  in 
the Paris Club. Failure  to reschedule debts with foreign governments 
can trigger cutoffs of foreign aid and export credits from industrial 
country governments. Such credits are not only an important  form of 
finance,  but are often necessary  for attracting  foreign  direct  investment 
by foreign  multinational  firms. 
Failure  to reach  an agreement  with the Fund  can also  jeopardize  new 
lending  from the World  Bank and the multilateral  development  banks. 
In some cases, such as with many World Bank structural  adjustment 
loans, World  Bank  conditionality  has de facto required  that  the country 
be in compliance  with an IMF program.  World  Bank  programs  are also 
often delayed until countries come into compliance  with the Fund. In 
any event, a country  that  rejects  an  IMF  program  does so at considerable 
risk to most of its other  channels  of official  financial  support. 
What this analysis suggests is that the creditor  governments  could 
significantly  alter the balance of power between the private  banks and 
the debtor  countries  if they desired  to do so. The most important  change 
would be the easiest: the creditor governments and the multilateral 
institutions  would simply have to declare that official  policies, such as 
foreign  aid and  IMF  programs,  would  not be conditioned  on the success 
or failure of negotiations  between the debtor country and the banks. 
Even without  more  explicit  instruments  of persuasion  or a legal require- 
ment  on the banks, such a shift  in policy would  probably  be sufficient  to 
lead to considerably  easier terms on bank debt servicing. A hands-off 
policy by the official  creditors  was precisely  the U.S. government  policy 
toward  Latin  American  debtor  governments  that  were in default  on the 
outstanding  international  bond obligations  during  the 1940s.  The policy Jeffrey Sachs  413 
was likely important  in inducing  the Foreign Bondholders  Protective 
Council,  which negotiated  with the debtor  governments,  to reach post- 
war settlements  involving,  in many  cases, a significant  amount  of relief. 
Depending on the nature of debt relief that is  sought by official 
creditors, such a laissez-faire  policy might  not be enough to impel the 
banks  to go along. In that  event, some combination  of regulatory  action 
or even legislation  might  be necessary  to induce  the banks  tojoin official 
creditors  in granting  debt  relief. In the end, though,  the U.S., European, 
and Japanese governments  would have several policy instruments  at 
their disposal if they chose to deploy them. The power of the U.S. 
government  to induce both U.S. and foreign  banks to grant  debt relief 
was evident in the case of the Chrysler  Corporation  bailout, when the 
government  successfully pressured  the banks to convert some of their 
debt  instruments  into Chrysler  equity.  As chroniclers  of the negotiations 
among Chrysler, the banks, and the U.S.  Treasury have observed, 
"Looming  over the bickering  and squabbling  between the lenders was 
the indubitable  presence of the U.S. government.  Both the American 
and the foreign lenders conducted their business at the mercy of 
Congress,  the Federal  Reserve Board  and  other  federal  agencies. Every 
facet  of banking-from  electronic  cash  dispensers  to new bank  branches- 
was monitored,  directly  or indirectly,  by the same politicians  who had 
granted aid to Chrysler [and who were now pressing for relief from 
Chrysler's  bank  creditors]."  12 
The Economics of Crisis Adjustment 
When  economists  consider  the  burden  of the  foreign  debt,  they usually 
think  of the cost to the debtor  country  of making  a transfer  to the rest of 
the world. The debt burden  is measured  simply as the discounted  flow 
of resources that the debtor country  must provide to its creditors. But 
over and above the transfer  burden  is the enormous deadweight  loss 
resulting from the way that the current debt overhang discourages 
investment  in the debtor  countries. 
Were  the debt burden  limited  to the direct  costs of making  transfers 
abroad,  the debt crisis would be painful  but not as debilitating  as it has 
12. Michael Moritz and Barret Seaman, Goingfor Broke: The Chrysler Stoty (Double- 
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been for most debtor  countries. For the typical Latin  American  debtor 
country, external  debt as a percentage  of GNP now averages  about 60 
percent. Suppose  that  in a normal  period  the country  has a trend  growth 
rate  of 4 percent  per annum  and  faces a real  interest  rate, including  fees 
and spreads,  of 8 percent. If the country  must service enough  debt each 
year to keep the debt-GNP  ratio constant, it must make net transfers 
abroad  equal  to the debt-GNP  ratio  multiplied  by the difference  between 
the interest  rate  and  the growth  rate. In other  words, the debt-GNP  ratio 
would be stabilized with annual net international  transfers equal to 
0.60 (0.08 -  0.04), or 2.4 percent of GNP. An annual  trade surplus  of 
2.4 percent of GNP seems a reasonably  attainable  goal. If the creditors 
are more  restrictive  and insist not that the debt-GNP  ratio  be stabilized 
but  that  the absolute  value  of the debt  be stabilized,  then  the net transfers 
abroad  would have to equal the annual interest burden, which is 4.8 
percent  of GNP, a much  larger  but also attainable  goal. 
How painful  would it be for a country  to generate  a trade surplus  of 
either  2.4 percent  or 4.8 percent of GNP? On the eve of the debt crisis, 
most of the Latin  American  debtors  were near  to trade  balance,  although 
current  accounts  were in large  deficit  since net interest  payments  abroad 
were already  significant.  Thus, the trade  surplus  would  have had to rise 
by, say, 2 to 5 percent of GNP. The ease of accomplishing  that shift is 
determined  in part by the ease with which domestic resources can be 
reoriented  from  domestic  production  to net exports  or  from  nontradables 
sectors to tradables  sectors. 
Suppose  as the simplest  case that  nontradables  can be converted  into 
tradables  at a constant  marginal  rate of substitution  that is equal to the 
ratio of prices of the two sectors at an initial  base period. Measured  in 
base period prices, each unit value reduction of nontradables  output 
generates a unit value increase of tradables  output. In this case, the 
requisite  trade  surpluses  can be achieved  by simply  forgoing  a couple of 
years of real  consumption  growth  while the economy continues  to grow 
along  its initial  growth  path. For  example,  an economy  begins  with trade 
balance,  with  consumption,  investment,  exports,  and  imports  all  initially 
growing  at 4 percent a year, with consumption  constituting  75 percent 
of GDP. As consumption  is cut back, all released resources move one 
for one into increased net exports, with all values measured at base 
period prices. After a year of unchanged  consumption, the national 
saving  rate would have grown  by about 2.8 percentage  points of GDP. Jeffrey Sachs  415 
In about 1.7 years, the national saving rate would have grown by the 
requisite 4.8 percentage points. Of course, with population growth, 
unchanged  aggregate  consumption  means falling per capita consump- 
tion. With  2 percent  population  growth,  per capita  consumption  would 
fall by 2 percent  for 1.7 years, rather  than rising  by 2 percent a year as 
would  be typical  along  the stable  growth  path. 
For some  debtor  countries,  such  as South  Korea,  the adjustment  went 
almost  this smoothly.  Korea  never  lost the confidence  of its international 
creditors,  so it was not forced  into an emergency  rescheduling,  although 
it did receive clear signals  in the early 1980s  to reduce its pace of debt 
accumulation.  Korean  total real consumption,  both public  and private, 
grew  very slowly during  1979-82,  only 2.2 percent  per  annum,  compared 
with 12.5 percent per annum during 1975-79. The trade deficit was 
reduced by 4.5 percentage points of GNP from 1979 to 1983. Korea 
suffered  only one year of negative  growth, 1980,  and  was able to restore 
rapid  growth  by 1983.  In 1986,  the economy is expected to grow by 10 
percent. 
For most of the debtor  countries, the adjustment  has been far more 
painful.  Indeed, per capita consumption  has declined  by far more than 
would theoretically be necessary, at the same time that growth has 
collapsed  and debt-GNP  and debt-export  ratios have continued  to rise. 
What is it that has prevented the smoother adjustments  achieved by 
Korea?  One difficulty  is that  the reduction  in domestic spending  has not 
been converted  one for one into higher  net exports, so that  real  GNP has 
declined  as the nontraded  goods sector has shrunk.  Even to the extent 
that resources have remained  fully employed, the cost of producing 
increasing amounts of tradables in terms of forgone production of 
nontradables  has proved to be steeply increasing  in most of the debtor 
countries,  since highly  protected  inefficient  industries  in Latin  America 
and Africa could not easily be reoriented  into producing  competitive 
exports. Also, as the nontraded  goods sector has collapsed, there has 
been a massive increase in unemployed  resources, which failed to find 
their  way into tradables  production.  Furthermore,  increases in volume 
of traditional  commodity  exports have been blunted  by the continuing 
fall  in commodities  prices, so that  commodity  export  earnings  have been 
stagnant  at best. 
The failure  of Latin America  and Africa  to increase export earnings 
should  be regarded  in part  as the legacy of their  inadequate  trade  policies 416  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
in previous decades. A diversified  export base was never established 
because of inward-looking,  protectionist  trade  policies and overvalued 
exchange  rates. Not only did  these trade  policies contribute  to the onset 
of the crisis;  they have made  it harder  to react  flexibly  in response.13 
A second  key difference  between Korea's smooth  adjustment  and  the 
experience  of most of the debtor  countries  is that the drop  in spending 
has fallen heavily on investment as well as consumption,  with highly 
deleterious  effects on growth  in the medium  run.  One  explanation  is that 
the credit  crunch  hit the Latin American  debtors  directly  in the public- 
sector budget. Whereas  in Korea much  of the debt was held directly  by 
the private  sector, it was held by the public sector in Latin  America, as 
a result of high budget deficits in the years preceding  the debt crisis. 
When the credit squeeze came in 1982, the Latin American  countries 
responded  by cutting  public  investment  and, in many cases, increasing 
money financing  of the budget, often with serious inflationary  conse- 
quences. The sharp  contraction  in government  spending  sent the Latin 
American  countries  into a deep recession in 1983.  During  the next two 
years, the Latin American countries groped with decreasing real tax 
revenues  (due  both  to inflation  and  to recession), rising  inflation,  and  the 
need to cut spending  even further.  Most important,  because of the large 
overhang of debt, the Latin American  governments  did not have the 
creditworthiness  even to borrow in their own capital markets, so that 
budget  deficits  could not serve as an automatic  stabilizer.  The choice for 
these countries  was therefore  whether  to reduce spending  in the midst 
of recession or to print  money. Most countries  chose some combination 
of the two approaches. 
The debt overhang  now discourages  investments  by the public  sector 
even beyond its direct budgetary  burden. A fragile  government  riding 
the storm  of a downward  spiral  of living  standards  cannot  shift spending 
from current consumption to investment without justifying the shift 
politically  on the grounds  that the citizens in the country will soon be 
much better off by virtue of the investment. But the citizenry of the 
debtor  countries  now believes that a shift from consumption  to invest- 
13. Brazil  is a partial  exception  in Latin  America.  For a discussion  of Latin  American 
trade  policies and their implications  for the debt crisis, see Sachs, "External  Debt and 
Macroeconomic  Performance  in Latin  America  and  East Asia." Jeffrey Sachs  417 
ment will serve first,  and perhaps  only, to improve  the capability  of the 
country  to service its debts. Unless an increase in investment  spending 
is combined with substantial  debt relief, the needed squeeze on con- 
sumption  is seen as something  that is done for Citibank  rather  than  for 
the nation  itself. 
The overhang  of the debt  also encourages  capital  flight,  which  further 
depresses investment,  the startling  decline in which is shown in table  9. 
Since the  private  sector  well understands  that  the public  sector  is starved 
for funds, no astute wealthholder  now leaves any signs of wealth lying 
around  to advertise  a ready source  of revenues  for the fiscal  authorities. 
Wealthholders  hold  their  assets outside  of the country  to avoid  taxation, 
with the result that new private savings simply spill over into capital 
flight,  rather  than  into real investment. Capital  flight  is now a symptom 
of the debt  overhang,  and  not a cause, as it was initially  when it reflected 
the conversion  of domestic financial  assets into foreign  financial  assets 
in anticipation  of devaluations  of overvalued  currencies. 
Private investment has been impeded even in the export sectors, 
which depend on foreign demand rather than domestic demand and 
which  have gained  substantially  in profitability  because  of real  exchange 
rate depreciations  since 1982. Private-sector  entrepreneurs  do not feel 
safe leaving  their  money in the country,  even in a temporarily  profitable 
sector, if it appears that the rest of the economy, and perhaps the 
government  itself, is collapsing.  The  investments  are  vulnerable  not only 
to tax increases, but also to the possibility that the government  will, at 
some point, abandon  debt servicing,  repudiate  the debt, and thereafter 
allow a sharp  real appreciation  of the exchange  rate  once again.  When  a 
stabilization  effort seems to be failing, even investment in currently 
profitable  sectors falls, since the risks of dramatic  reversals  in govern- 
ment policy are heightened. Private investment incentives are also 
reduced  to the extent that  private  investments  are complementary  with 
public investments. The government must provide the roads, dams, 
ports, and railroads  necessary to make new exports possible. All such 
public  investments  have declined  sharply  in recent years. 
There are several more subtle ways in which the debt overhang 
discourages  investment.  Now that  the ability  of the debtor  governments 
to continue  to service their  debts is in doubt, external  private  creditors 
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Individually,  these creditors have an incentive to call in their claims 
against  the overextended  debtor  countries, even if doing so injures  the 
economic performance  of the debtor so much that the creditors suffer 
collectively. Preventing  such a destructive  race to liquidate  assets is one 
of the major  purposes  of a bankruptcy  code, which restricts  the ability 
of individual  creditors  to act against  the group  interest. Unfortunately, 
countries  cannot file for Chapter  11 protection. It has been argued  that 
the concerted  lending  packages  have overcome the problem,  but in fact 
the commercial  banks  have been able  to reduce  their  absolute  exposures 
in Latin America  and Africa  despite the strategy  of concerted lending. 
It appears that while exposure to debtor governments has gone up, 
exposure to  the private sectors of  these countries, which are not 
protected  by concerted  lending,  has declined  even more. 
At present, new external  lenders  will not make  new loans to a debtor 
government  even  for  investments  whose  returns  easily  exceed the  market 
cost of capital, since those lenders rightly fear that their claims will 
simply  become part  of the enormous  pool of uncollectible  claims  against 
the debtor. Even a debtor  government  with a good investment  project 
will  generally  not  be able  to attract  new creditors,  unless it can somehow 
assure them that their claims will be granted seniority relative to the 
existing creditors.  Such assurances  are not easy to structure,  and they 
may even violate "negative pledge" clauses in the original  loan agree- 
ments. 
Investment  rates will thus continue  to be insufficient  for many  of the 
debtor  countries, not because of a shortage  of good investment  oppor- 
tunities, but rather  because of the wrong financial  incentives resulting 
from the debt overhang. Prospects for long-term  growth are therefore 
bleak  unless the incentives to make new investments  can be changed. 
Table 9.  Ratios of Gross Investment to GDP, Debtor Nations, Various Years, 1980-85 
Percent 
Category  1980  1983  1984  1985 
Countries  with 
debt servicing  problems  25.4  19.1  18.0  18.0 
Countries  without 
debt servicing  problems  28.1  26.5  26.4  26.6 
Western  hemisphere  23.4  17.4  17.2  17.9 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  19.9  17.7  16.5  17.2 
Source:  IMF,  World Economic  Outlook (April 1986), table A7,  p.  186. Jeffrey Sachs  419 
New Strategies for Restoring Debtor Country Growth 
In the early days of the debt crisis it made sense for the creditor 
governments  to focus their  energies  on protecting  the commercial  banks. 
Nobody knew in mid-1982  whether the debtor governments would in 
fact be able or willing to service their debts or whether  the large  banks 
might  succumb  to a banking  run. Also, it was clear  that  much  of the debt 
problem  was the result of policies in the debtor countries that were in 
obvious need of reform. A tough approach  based on continued debt 
servicing, concerted  lending, and conditionality  made sense. That case 
is much  harder  to make today. The commercial  banks  are clearly much 
stronger and would be able to absorb partial debt forgiveness. The 
debtors, on the other side, have now lived through several years of 
austerity, with little evident improvement  in their creditworthiness  or 
growth  prospects. 
It is not easy to predict  the prospects  for most of the debtor  countries. 
On  the one hand,  with  low investment  rates  and  declining  terms  of trade, 
their prospects appear  rather  bleak. On the other hand, with declining 
world  interest  rates  and  a depreciating  dollar  that  should  eventually  push 
up the dollar  prices of developing country exports, the situation  could 
brighten, even substantially. In these circumstances it is hard to be 
categorical, but surely the present strategy of muddling  through  does 
not protect  the debtor  countries  against  the obvious risks that they now 
face. At the very least, many  of the risks should  now be shifted  from  the 
debtor countries back to the international  capital markets  where they 
belong. 
The problem  of deciding  what to do now about the debt crisis is that 
no agreed-upon  standards  apply.  In  domestic  debt  crises, the  participants 
may rely on bankruptcy  law to provide a framework  for action. In the 
international  context, such a framework  does not exist. A simple view 
would hold that policymakers  should therefore  enforce whatever con- 
tracts have been written between the debtors and the creditor  banks, 
regardless  of the resulting  duress  or economic inefficiencies.  But such a 
view flies in the face of common sense and runs counter to the basic 
theory of contracts itself, which has long held that contracts should 
sometimes  not be enforced  and should sometimes  even be rewritten  by 
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argue that since contracts are expensive  to write and therefore cannot 
generally include contingencies  for low-probability  events,  it is some- 
times the duty of a judge or an adjudicating party "to reduce the costs 
of  contract  negotiation  by  supplying  contract  terms  that the  parties 
would probably have adopted explicitly had they negotiated over them." 14 
This principle is applied in practice when courts impose restructurings 
of long-term commodity supply agreements. After a sharp rise in energy 
prices  in  the  early  1970s,  for  example,  the  Aluminum  Company  of 
America (ALCOA) sought relief from a long-term contract under which 
it was a supplier to Essex Group, Inc. The contract had become extremely 
unprofitable to ALCOA and extremely favorable for the Essex  Group. 
The court gave relief to ALCOA by imposing a "reasonable" reformation 
of the contract on the two parties, after they had failed to renegotiate the 
terms on their own. The court described its role as follows: 
The Court's  role here is limited  to framing  a remedy  for a problem  [the parties] 
did not foresee and  provide  for. And  while  the Court  willingly  concedes that  the 
managements  of ALCOA and Essex are better able to conduct their business 
than is the Court, in this dispute the Court  has information  and hindsight  far 
superior  to that  which  the  parties  had  when  they  made  their  contract.  The  parties 
may both be better served by an informed  judicial decision based upon the 
known circumstances  than  by a decision wrenched  from  words of the contract 
which were not chosen with a prevision  of today's circumstances.  The Court 
gladly  concedes  that  the  parties  might  today  evolve a better  working  arrangement 
by negotiation  than  the Court  can impose. But they have not done so, and  a rule 
that the Court  may not act would have the perverse  effect of discouraging  the 
parties  from  resolving  this dispute  or future  disputes on their  own. Only a rule 
which  permits  judicial  action . ..  will provoke  a desirable  practical  incentive  for 
businessmen  to negotiate  their  own resolution  to problems  which  arise  in the life 
of long term  contracts.15 
In the case  of the debt crisis,  the question  is whether to enforce  a 
contract in which the contracting parties "did not foresee  and provide 
for" such extremely low-probability events  as all-time low commodity 
prices,  all-time  high  interest  rates,  or  the  collapse  of  the  debtor's 
economy. 
14. Richard  A. Posner  and Andrew  M. Rosenfield,  "Impossibility  and Related  Doc- 
trines  in Contract  Law:  An Economic  Analysis,  " Journal  ofLegal Studies,  vol. 6 (January 
1977),  p. 88. 
15. Richard  E. Speidel,  "Court-Imposed  Price  Adjustments  UnderLong-Term  Supply 
Contracts,"  Northwestern  University Law Review,  vol.  76 (October  1981), p. 380. The 
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By the standard  of "contract  completion," debt contracts  should  be 
forgiven in at least two circumstances: when a debtor country has 
suffered  such a large  loss of income that  continued  servicing  of the debt 
poses enormous  risks of economic duress or political  and social insta- 
bility, or when enforcement  of the contract  would result  in such a large 
decline in the debtor's capacity to repay that both the creditors and 
debtor  would  be better  off with  a partial  forgiveness  of the debt. The first 
case is a plausible standard  since the debtor would presumably  have 
chosen to insure against  repayments  in such a situation.  In the second 
case, it would  be in the interests  of the parties  to renegotiate  the contract 
voluntarily,  unless  one of the  parties  believes  that  instead  of renegotiation 
it can entice a third  party, such as a creditor  government,  to bail it out. 
Twenty  or thirty  years  ago, few people  would  have needed  convincing 
that  it is sometimes  appropriate  to excuse part  or all of the obligations  of 
a debtor  country.  One lesson of the 1930s  was that  it is possible to push 
countries  past  the breaking  point  in attempting  to collect on debts. Three 
major  policy mistakes of the 1930s  demonstrated  that lesson. The first 
mistake  was the U.S. insistence on repayments  of the inter-allied  war 
debts. The debts proved to be uncollectible  in the end, but the United 
States pushed hard  to collect them and severely weakened its allies in 
the process. Following a one-year repayment  moratorium,  President 
Hoover pressured  France to make payments in 1932, in the depths of 
the Great  Depression,  and  thereby  caused  the fall of the Herriot  govern- 
ment. By  1933, U.S.  pressures for repayment and the repayments 
themselves  finally  ceased, under  the realities  of the depression. 
The second and  more  notorious  mistake  was to press for collection  of 
the German  reparations  payments, even after  Germany  had lost access 
to international  capital markets in the late 1920s and even after the 
German  economy sank into deep depression. As Kindleberger  puts it, 
"Deflation  produced  by the cutoff in American  lending  was enhanced 
by the brutal  policies, beginning  in March 1930, of Heinrich  Bruning, 
German  Prime  Minister,  who was determined  to show the Allies that it 
was impossible for Germany to pay, even if he had to destroy the 
economy  and  the political  system to do so." 16  He succeeded  all too well, 
though  many observers failed to recognize what was happening.  Just 
16. Charles P. Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (London: George 
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before Germany's  utter collapse came its largest  trade surplus,  which, 
as Harold  Moulton  and  Leo Pasvolsky  noted  in a 1932  Brookings  study, 
"was proclaimed  by many unanalytical  writers  as conclusive evidence 
of Germany's  steady progress  . ..  [when]  it was in fact little more than 
a depression  phenomenon."  17 
The third  misadventure  in enforcing  debt repayments  was the case of 
Argentina,  one of the few countries  in Latin  America  that  continued  full 
debt servicing  in the 1930s. The British  were able to keep the Federal 
Government  of Argentina  on track with respect to debt servicing and 
were able to extract significant  trade  concessions as well. According  to 
arguments  heard  today, one might  expect that  Argentina  was well served 
later on by a favorable international  reputation  based on its "good 
behavior.  " The  truth  is precisely  the  opposite.  The  subsequent  Argentine 
revulsion against  foreign influence  contributed  to the rise to power of 
Juan  Peron, a nationalist  demagogue  who did much to destroy both the 
Argentine  economy and  its international  reputation  over the succeeding 
decades.  18 
By 1943,  the lessons were clear to the young analyst  Henry Wallich. 
Writing  about  the overhang  of defaulted  Latin  American  bonds, Wallich 
had little doubt that these countries should be forgiven much of their 
debt  burdens.  Rather  than  arguing  that  debt  forgiveness  would  debilitate 
the private  capital  markets,  Wallich  argued  the opposite, that "a satis- 
factory settlement  of the defaults  would greatly  improve  the prospects 
of private  foreign  lending  after the war."  19  He applauded  the fact that 
the U.S. government  did not apply  pressures  to get full servicing  of the 
debt and noted approvingly  that "apparently  no attempt  has been made 
to tie up the liberal  [U.S. government]  loans which began  to be made  in 
1940  with demands  for resumption  of service to the defaulted  bonds.  "20 
17. See Harold  G. Moulton  and  Leo Pasvolsky, War  Debts and World  Prosperity  (D. 
Appleton-Century  Company,  Inc., for the Brookings  Institution,  1932),  p. 306. 
18. The  role  of Argentina's  foreign  economic  policy  in Peron's  ascension  to power  has 
been  noted  by several  observers.  Diaz-Alejandro  put  it this  way: "The  nationalist-populist 
coup  of June  1943  . ..  was able  to revive  memories  of wounded  national  pride  with  notable 
domestic  political  success and  with  disturbing  consequences  for  the  international  system" 
("Latin  American  Debt," p. 389).  See also Richard  D. Mallon,  in collaboration  with  Juan 
V.  J.  Sourrouille,  Economic  Policymaking  in a  Conflict Society:  The Argentine  Case 
(Harvard  University  Press, 1975),  for a similar  view. 
19. See H. C. Wallich,  "The  Future  of Latin  American  Bonds,"  American  Economic 
Review,  vol. 33 (June  1943),  p. 321. 
20. Ibid., p. 335. Jeffrey Sachs  423 
From the 1940s  to the 1970s,  the major  creditor  countries  continued 
to pursue the logic of debt relief rather  than debt rescheduling  when 
appropriate  circumstances  arose.  An  instructive  case is that  of Indonesia, 
whose turnaround  in the mid-1960s  is one of the greatest in the past 
twenty-five years. All of the right things happened in Indonesia: a 
hyperinflation  was ended, a trade  liberalization  occurred,  and  economic 
growth  and creditworthiness  were restored. And the financial  basis of 
the success was a generous  and  concessionary  treatment  of Indonesia's 
foreign  debt. 
When President  Sukarno  left the Indonesian  government  it was on 
the verge  of bankruptcy  and  a hyperinflation  that  topped 1000  percent  in 
1966.  After a civil war, a new military  regime  under  President  Suharto 
began  to bring  economic order  to the country. The Suharto  regime  first 
received debt relief  from  the official  creditors  (in those simpler  days the 
commercial  banks  were not involved) as of late 1966,  when three years 
of grace  on all principal  and  interest  payments  were granted.  Moreover, 
the interest was not compounded, so that the postponement  reflected 
substantial  relief in present  value terms. In 1970,  a standing  committee 
of creditor governments, known as the Intergovernmental  Group on 
Indonesia,  was constituted  to negotiate  new terms  with the Indonesian 
government.  The specific nature  of the agreement  was as follows. The 
debt  was consolidated,  with principal  to be repaid  in thirty  equal  annual 
installments  and interest, fixed at 3 percent, below market  rates, to be 
repaid  in fifteen  installments,  to begin  after  fifteen  years (in 1986)  and  to 
run  through  the year  2000.  The arrangement  also permitted  Indonesia  to 
postpone  up to three  annual  payments  in the event of a shortfall  in export 
earnings,  following a precedent set in the 1946 Anglo-American  loan 
agreement.  The package, in all, represented  substantial  debt relief in 
present  value terms  and  offered  great  flexibility  for the country. 
The Indonesian  operation  was enormously  successful. The hyperin- 
flation  ended  in the late 1960s,  and since that  time, with the exception of 
debt problems  of the state oil company  in 1975,  Indonesia's  macroeco- 
nomic performance  has been among the best in the developing  world, 
combining  high  economic growth  and  low inflation  rates.21 
The settlement of Turkish  debt at the end of the 1970s is another 
21. Sachs, "External  Debt and Macroeconomic  Performance  in Latin America  and 
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example  of how generous  terms  for repayment  of debt can contribute  to 
economic recovery. Like Indonesia, Turkey  represents  a vital foreign 
policy interest  of the NATO  countries,  an interest  that  was underscored 
in 1979  by the fall of the Shah of Iran. Between 1980  and 1983,  Turkey 
therefore  received a large  package  of support  from the IMF, the World 
Bank, individual  OECD  governments  (including  $1.5 billion  of conces- 
sional balance of payments support),  and the Saudi Arabian  Monetary 
Authority.  That  financial  cushion  obviated  the need for Turkey  to make 
large outward  transfers  to its creditors. Under its protective financial 
umbrella,  Turkey  has  followed  through  on an  ambitious  program  of trade 
liberalization  and policy reform,  which is now paying  dividends  in the 
form  of strong  export  growth.  Its experience  contrasts  starkly  with that 
of Mexico, for example, which was required  to make very large net 
resource  transfers  to the rest of the world  after 1981.  The trade  balance 
of the two countries,  in billions  of dollars,  is shown below: 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Turkey  -4.6  -3.9  -2.7  -3.0  -3.0 
Mexico  -2.8  -4.1  6.8  13.8  12.8 
A Strategy for Granting Debt Relief 
The key to granting  debt  relief  is to make  it selective, so that  not every 
debtor  country  feels the urge  to suspend  its international  payments  and 
so that the contractual basis for future international  lending is not 
fundamentally  undermined.  For  these purposes,  I would  propose  simply 
that  relief be granted  according  to a formula  that  both gives relief to the 
countries  that, having  experienced  the largest  declines in income, need 
relief the most, and minimizes  the moral  hazard  that future  borrowers 
will undertake  policies with the goal of achieving debt relief. These 
criteria  are  the sort  that  creditors  and  debtors  would select as contingen- 
cies that  would  modify  the terms  of the contract  if they were negotiating 
with  a clean slate. In order  to minimize  moral  hazard  problems,  the relief 
should  be granted  only as part  of an internationally  supervised  program 
of stabilization  and reform.  The case-by-case approach  of the IMF and 
World  Bank should  be continued,  but with financial  arrangements  that 
are  much  more  attractive  to the debtor  countries  than  those now offered. 
Conditioning  relief on income is  problematic, since it does  not Jeffrey Sachs  425 
distinguish  between  income declines that  arise from  exogenous factors, 
such  as the terms  of trade,  and  those arising  from  bad  policies. However, 
in practice it would be difficult  to make a more refined  rule. For one 
thing, existing models are generally not good enough to track with 
precision  the sources of a particular  shortfall  in income. Moreover,  in a 
world  of despotic regimes,  in which the citizens of a country  often have 
little control  over the bad  policies of the government,  it is a good idea to 
put  the lenders  on notice that  relief  will be granted  to the country  if GNP 
falls, even if that decline is policy induced. In that way, the lenders are 
forced to monitor  the actions of the despots in a way that the country's 
own citizens cannot. (Why should  we endeavor  to protect, after  all, the 
sanctity of contracts between the banks and corrupt, unaccountable 
regimes  like those of Videla  of Argentina,  or Marcos,  or Bokassa, who, 
with the knowledge  of the bankers,  all used the loans for private  gain?) 
A workable  basis might  be to grant  relief, on a progressive  scale, to 
countries  whose per capita incomes have dropped 15 percent or more 
relative  to previous  peaks. The  relief  to be granted  would  be a suspension 
of interest payments for a given period, without capitalization  of the 
missed payments. The suspension should apply to all debts currently 
subject to rescheduling  by the commercial banks and by the official 
creditors  in the Paris  Club. As a rough  example, countries  whose living 
standards,  as measured  by real  per  capita  national  income,  have declined 
by 15-25 percent since 1980 would be permitted  to forgo all interest 
payments  for  five years. Countries  with  a decline  of more  than  25  percent 
in living standards  would forgo interest payments for ten years. (In 
reality the scales would have to be smoothed so that countries would 
not have the incentive to reduce incomes to earn more relief. Different 
degrees  of relief  on debts of differing  vintages  would have to be worked 
out. Moreover, considerations of the country's size, level of living 
standard,  size of external  versus internal  shocks, and extent of hidden 
income through  capital  flight  might  be part  of the formula.)  In addition 
to the interest  relief, I presume  that  all principal  payments  would  be fully 
rescheduled  for a period  of several years. 
Table 10 shows how this simple example would work for the Latin 
American  economies through  the end of 1985  based on an interest rate 
of 7 percent.  The amount  of bank  relief shown  is the present  value of the 
skipped  interest  payments.  Overall  relief by U.S. banks  in this example 
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The forgiveness by U.S.  banks would represent approximately  6.2 
percent of U.S. bank capital. Presumably,  regulators  would allow the 
banks  to amortize  the write-off  of the debt over several  years to smooth 
the  effects on the  banks'  earnings.  For  instance,  income  could  be reduced 
simply as the interest  payments  are missed. For the African  countries, 
the total U.S. bank  exposure is approximately  $4.7 billion. If interest  is 
forgiven  for an average  of five years for all of the African  countries, the 
cost to the U.S. banks would be on the order  of $1.4 billion, or a little 
more  than 1  percent  of U.S. bank  capital. 
The following  simple  illustration  shows the benefits  of interest  relief. 
For a country with a public debt-GNP ratio of 60 percent, facing a 7 
percent  interest  rate, the annual  interest  burden  is 4.2 percent of GDP. 
With  investment-GDP  ratios  in Latin  America  on the order  of 14  percent, 
interest  payments  represent  about 30 percent  of gross domestic invest- 
ment.22  Investment rates could rise by about one-third  if the savings 
Table 10.  Progressive Debt Relief Based on Decline in GDP, Latin America,  1980-85a 
Billions  of dollars unless  otherwise  indicated 
Bank exposure  Debt  relief  U.S.  bank 
Bank for  Bank for  relief as 
Per capita  International  International  percent  of 
real GDP  U.S.  Settlements  U.S.  Settlements  U.S.  bank 
decline  banks  banks  banks  banks  capital 
15-25  percent 
Argentina  8.7  27.8  2.7  8.6  2.6 
Peru  1.5  5.2  0.5  1.6  0.5 
Uruguay  0.9  2.1  0.3  0.7  0.3 
Venezuela  9.8  25.8  3.0  8.0  2.8 
25 percent  or more 
Bolivia  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.1 
Total  21.0  61.5  6.6  19.1  6.2 
Source:  Author's  calculations  as described  in text.  Bank exposure  data are for end of December  1985. U.S.  data 
are from  "Country  Exposure  Lending  Survey."  BIS  data  are from  Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development/Bank  for  International  Settlements,  "Statistics  on  External  Indebtedness:  Bank  and  Trade-Related 
Non-Bank  External Claims on Individual Borrowing Countries and Territories at End-December  1985" (OECD/BIS: 
Paris and Basle,  July  1986). 
a.  Debt  relief  consists  of  a  suspension  of  interest  payments  without  capitalization  of  the  missed  payments. 
Countries whose  per capita real GDP declined  15-25 percent from 1980 to  1985 would be permitted to forgo interest 
payments  for five years.Countries  whose  per capita GDP declined  by more than 25 percent  would  be permitted to 
forgo ten years of interest payments.  The amount of debt relief shown is the net present value of the skipped interest 
payments.  Calculations are based on an interest rate of 7 percent.  Figures are rounded. 
22. The investment  rates for Argentina,  Peru, and Venezuela  in 1985  were, respec- 
tively, 11.7, 14.2,  and 18.3  percent  of GDP, according  to data  from  DRI, Latin American 
Economic Review (DRI,  Summer  1986). Jeffrey Sachs  427 
from  debt  relief  were channeled  towards  higher  investments.  The easing 
of the budget  burden  would be on the order  of 20-25 percent  of central 
government  revenues. 
Given  the significant  benefits  to be achieved  by relief,  would  countries 
actually  pursue poor economic growth  in order to merit reduced debt 
payments?  Almost surely, the answer is no. The countries  in question 
have had historical  per capita growth rates of 2 percent or more per 
annum.  Thus, for per capita  GDP  to fall by 15  percent  between 1980  and 
1985, the decline relative to trend is on the order of 25 percent. The 
cumulative  decline in output  relative to trend  is of course greater  than 
25 percent, since one must add together  the shortfalls  in output  in each 
of the years  between 1980  and 1985.  Assuming  that  output  falls smoothly 
by 3 percent per year during  the interval, the cumulative  output loss 
relative to trend is on the order of 75 percent of trend GNP.23  There 
would also be further  loss in the future  as output  recovers. These total 
losses must  be compared  with the gains to relief. Assuming  a debt-GNP 
ratio of 60 percent and five years of interest relief, the present value 
savings are on the order of 18.6 percent of GNP.24  The savings are 
obviously  a small  fraction  of the GNP losses. 
For countries  that  have already  suffered  a significant,  but  less than 15 
percent,  decline  in  per  capita  income,  it  might  pay  to depress  the  economy 
for an additional  short  period  to qualify  for relief. There  are two ways to 
ameliorate  the problem. First, the extent of relief could be phased in 
gradually,  rather  than  in one step. Second, when a government  appeals 
for  relief,  its policies  in the year  preceding  the relief  could  be scrutinized, 
as happens  in bankruptcy  proceedings,  in order  to disqualify  countries 
that intentionally  and flagrantly  pursue bad policies for the sake of 
gaining  relief. 
Strategies for Increased Capital Flows 
About half of the debtor countries in Latin America, including  the 
two biggest, Brazil and Mexico, would not qualify  for relief under  the 
standards  illustrated  above. What should be done for countries that 
23. The deviation  from  previous  trend  would  be 5 percent  in 1981,  10  percent  in 1982, 
15  percent  in 1983,  20 percent  in 1984,  and  25 percent  in 1985,  for a cumulative  decline  of 
75 percent. 
24. See footnote 8, which showed relief to equal 0.31 of the face value of the debt. 
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might  not  be eligible  for  relief  but  that  are  nevertheless  suffering  seriously 
from the effects of the debt crisis? An effective strategy would be to 
encourage  higher  investment rates, based on greater  foreign financial 
support,  in order  to spur  recovery. Moreover,  the predictability  of that 
foreign support  should be enhanced;  otherwise, the banks and private 
wealthholders  will continue to withdraw  their assets from the debtor 
countries. 
At present, new funds come entirely from existing bank creditors, 
who are  already  locked  into  a financial  bind  with  the debtor  country,  and 
from  the official  creditors.  The arrangement  poses the continuing  para- 
dox that it is precisely those banks  whose portfolios  are filled  with bad 
loans that  are called  upon  to increase  their  exposures  the most when the 
situation  deteriorates  in one of the debtor countries. Since the banks 
have become increasingly  reluctant  to play this game, official  creditors 
have more  and  more  begun  to bail  out the banks,  in the sense of providing 
net transfers  into the country  while the banks  make  net transfers  out. 
If the existing bank  loans are indeed viable over the longer  term  and 
therefore  should  not be forgiven  at this  juncture,  they will remain  viable 
if the country  borrows  externally  in order  to spur  investments, as long 
as those incremental investments have a rate of return above the 
incremental  cost of borrowing  and  as long as the borrowing  government 
raises  internal  revenues  sufficiently  to service  the debts. For  this reason, 
existing creditors  should be willing, and indeed favorably  disposed, to 
see new creditors enter the scene on a senior basis, if they can be 
guaranteed  that the incremental  funds will be utilized for profitable 
investment  projects. Emphatically,  the new lenders would not have to 
be banks. Senior lending could be made on the basis of marketable 
securities purchased by asset funds, multinational  corporations, or 
private  wealthholders,  in addition  to banks. 
My proposal  would be to increase and stabilize  the inflow of capital 
into  the debtor  countries  by an  arrangement  that  reschedules  the existing 
debt while allowing  new creditors  to enter  on the basis of seniority.  The 
multilateral  institutions  would  be in charge  of monitoring  the investment 
programs  of the debtor  countries  to verify  that  incremental  capital  flows 
from  abroad  indeed  increase  national  investment  rates on the margin,  a 
task that would necessarily involve conditionality  on both the level of 
the  macroeconomy  and  the  public-sector  investment  budget.  They  would 
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by monitoring  the arrangement  that new debts get serviced before old 
debts. If the debtor countries resume their economic growth, as the 
commercial  banks  keep predicting  that they will, then both the existing 
creditors  and the new creditors  will be repaid.  If, on the other  hand,  the 
debtor countries continue to stagnate, then the existing creditors will 
find  that  their  claims  are even further  reduced  in value, so that  the assets 
would  have to be forgiven  at some point. The approach  has the virtue  of 
not forcing a decision on the issue of forgiveness today, but rather 
allowing creditors and debtors to see whether an economic recovery 
materializes. 
As in the case of debt  relief,  an approach  such as this should  be guided 
by clear  and objective  rules. For example, eligibility  might  be limited  to 
countries  that  have suffered  an absolute  decline  in per  capita  GDP  during 
1980-85. On such a standard,  all of the major  Latin American  debtors 
would be eligible,  with the exception of Colombia.  The overall  package 
would involve rescheduling  of the existing debt, some new concerted 
lending  by the existing  creditors,  and senior  lending  by new creditors  in 
amounts  that  would be tied to the availability  of worthwhile  investment 
projects  in the country. The concerted  lending  of the existing creditors 
should  also be put  on a more  automatic  basis. For example,  the creditors 
might  be required  to put in 2.5 percent of existing exposure each year 
during  the life of such an arrangement.  They would then receive two- 
thirds  of a 7.5 percent interest repayment,  and relend one third. New 
lenders could be allowed to enter on a senior basis up to a yearly 
maximum  of 5 percent  of existing exposure, or more if the country  has 
unusually  attractive  investment  prospects. Finally, a country's partici- 
pation  in such a package should  be conditioned  on compliance  with an 
internationally  supervised  adjustment  program. 
Conditionality  and the Debt Crisis 
I have so far  said  little  about  how to tie a debt  package  to performance 
by the debtor  countries. For one reason, my emphasis  has been on the 
need to provide more financial support to the debtor countries; for 
another,  I have less to quarrel  with regarding  conditionality  than I do 
regarding  financial  support.  Debt relief and debt reschedulings  should 
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they are now. Policy reform is clearly needed to enable most of the 
debtor countries to resume economic growth and regain  creditworthi- 
ness, and the provision  of new lending  or debt relief can be effectively 
and  properly  conditioned  on such reforms  being  undertaken. 
The  major  weaknesses  of the current  conditionality  programs  are  two: 
they are underfunded  and so ask too much for too little in return,  and 
they demand  unrealistically  rapid  reform. The same lack of realism is 
evident  in the conditionality  in the Baker  plan, which emphasizes  issues 
of microeconomic  efficiency:  opening  up of foreign  trade, privatization 
of state enterprise, and encouragement  of foreign direct investment. 
Naturally, such liberalization  efforts should be a part of a long-term 
economic adjustment  program,  but they must be expected to happen 
gradually,  over a span  of decades rather  than  a couple of years. 
Indeed, the  simple and sad truth about most attempts at rapid 
liberalization  is that they do not succeed. Success tends to require  a 
healthy macroeconomic  environment,  so that slower growth  in sectors 
where  protection  is removed  is balanced  by higher  growth  in other  parts 
of the economy. Also, in a growing  economy, the "declining" sectors 
can  decline  in  relative  terms  without  having  to decline  brutally  in  absolute 
terms. Reductions  in labor can then be accomplished  through  attrition 
rather  than  through  layoffs. In the celebrated  study  by Anne Krueger  of 
twenty-three  liberalization  attempts from the 1950s through  the early 
1970s, only four actually succeeded in the long run.25  And in all four 
cases, the initial  macroeconomic  conditions  were vastly superior  to the 
conditions now facing the major debtor countries.26  The study also 
confirmed  that  liberalizations  that do take hold are instituted  gradually. 
The most celebrated  instance of liberalization  in the past thirty  years is 
probably  that of South Korea, which began to liberalize in the early 
1960s.  And  yet after  more  than  two decades  of steady  trade  liberalization, 
nobody  today  would  call Korea  an example  of a truly  open economy. Its 
foreign trade regime is characterized  by a rational tariff structure, a 
declining  number  of quantitative  restrictions,  and  a unified  and compet- 
itive exchange  rate. But free trade  it is not. 
25.  Anne 0.  Krueger, Foreign  Trade Regimes  and Economic Development:  Liberali- 
zation  Attempts  and  Consequences,  A  Special  Conference  Series  on  Foreign  Trade 
Regimes  and  Economic  Development,  vol. 10  (New York:  National  Bureau  of Economic 
Research,  1978).  By the "long  run," I mean  up to the time  of publication  of the study. 
26. See Sachs, "Conditionality  and the Debt Crisis: Some Thoughts  for the World 
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Perhaps  the most  troubling  aspect  of the recent  emphasis  on structural 
reform  is the virtual  neglect  of issues of equity  and  fairness  in the debtor 
countries. Income distribution  in Latin America has widened signifi- 
cantly in the past ten years, as the wealthy have protected  themselves 
through  capital  flight  and  low tax payments,  while  the poor  have suffered 
the burdens  of high  inflation  and economic austerity.  Many  of the basic 
problems  of the Latin  American  societies are ones of fairness  in the first 
instance. The creditor  governments,  and especially the United States, 
should  insist  that  the  debtor  governments  come up  with  fair  and  equitable 
burden  sharing  within their countries as part of the adjustment  effort. 
How to do that, however, is best part  of a long and separate  discussion. Comments 
and Discussion 
John Williamson: In my opinion the gloom in Sachs's assessment of 
where the debt crisis has got to is somewhat overdone. At least two 
countries  that  came close to having  to reschedule,  Colombia  and  Korea, 
have recovered impressively. Turkey is  not the only country that 
rescheduled  and has resumed  voluntary  borrowing:  both Hungary  and 
Yugoslavia  also fall into that category. If Brazil can make the Cruzado 
Plan stick, it will almost certainly  be  judged sufficiently  creditworthy  to 
resume  limited  voluntary  borrowing  next year. (Unfortunately  it seems 
rather  unlikely  that the Cruzado  Plan will succeed: Jose Sarney shares 
Ronald Reagan's spinelessness when faced with the need for a tax 
increase, and lacks the latitude  that circumstances  are giving the latter 
to procrastinate.)  One should  also recall  that  more  than  60 percent  of the 
population  of the Third  World  lives in countries, including  India, that 
never did succumb  to the debt crisis. 
Similarly,  Sachs  measures  the severity  of the debt  burden  by the debt- 
export ratio in table 8. But the ratio of debt service to exports, at least 
as relevant  a measure,  has behaved  much  less discouragingly  as a result 
of declining  interest  rates  and  long-term  rescheduling.  For example, the 
ratios  for Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico have declined  from  53 percent, 
52 percent, and 36 percent, respectively, in 1982 to respectively 48 
percent, 36 percent, and 30 percent in 1985. One can even find a few 
isolated cases that look hopeful in Sub-Saharan  Africa, such as Bot- 
swana, Cameroon, Ghana, and Ivory Coast. And in Bolivia, while 
circumstances  are indeed bad, they are certainly  not as bad as is sug- 
gested by the official  figure  of a 28 percent decline in per capita GNP, 
which measures how much of the economy was forced underground, 
rather  than  how much  of the economy was forced  out of existence. So I 
think  the gloom is overdone. 
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Nevertheless, it remains  true  that  there  is more  than  enough  room  for 
pessimism about the situation in many debtor countries. Two things 
have turned  out worse than anticipated  in earlier  projections, such as 
those of William  Cline.  I One is the fall in commodity  prices. The drop  in 
the price of oil has posed a major  problem for some of the debtors, 
although  it has brought  relief  to others:  overall  it has probably  made  the 
debt problem worse rather than better. The other is the cutback in 
commercial  bank  lending. In 1983  the IMF's World  Economic Outlook 
was forecasting  a 1986  current  account deficit in the nonoil developing 
countries  of $93  billion,  which  presumably  implied  a belief that  it would 
be possible  to finance  a deficit  of that  size. But  the  forecast  in the October 
1986  issue was $27 billion. The drop is clearly the result of the foreign 
exchange  constraint,  caused  primarily  by the unwillingness  of the banks 
to resume  lending. 
It is therefore hardly surprising  that discussion is turning to the 
question  of debt relief. The banks have brought  the prospect on them- 
selves by their  failure  to act collectively to maintain  an adequate  flow of 
new lending.  Even though  his argument  is not supported  by much  detail, 
I am convinced that Sachs is  correct in claiming that under some 
circumstances  both  parties  could  gain  from  debt  relief:  the debt  overhang 
is creating a set of incentives in the debtor countries that make it 
impossible  to envisage new investment or, therefore, an expansion of 
nontraditional  exports. 
Does endorsement  of the principle  of debt relief imply endorsement 
of the Bradley  plan?  As I see it, there  are  three  features  in that  plan. The 
first  is an increase of $40 billion to $50 billion in foreign  aid over three 
years, financed  by a tax on the banks. I have no problem  with that  part. 
The second element is essentially World  Bank conditionality.  On that 
my reactions  are very similar  to Sachs's, namely  that  the principles  are 
right  but that the time limit is too short and inflexible  with too much 
pressure  to liberalize  trade  in the short  run  rather  than  do it as and  when 
balance  of payments  developments  permit  liberalization  without  income 
compression. The third feature of the Bradley plan is that it would 
provide  something  like 30  percent  of the total  relief  to Brazil.  Now Brazil 
is a country  whose welfare would probably  be jeopardized  rather  than 
promoted  by gaining  debt relief, because the benefit  of the relief would 
1.  William R.  Cline,  International  Debt  and  the  Stability  of  the  World Economy 
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be outweighed  in present value terms by the loss in creditworthiness 
that  would  come about  through  accepting  debt  relief. On  the other  hand, 
the Bradley  plan  offers almost  no relief to Sub-Saharan  Africa,  because 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  is not a major  debtor  to the commercial  banks.  Only 
$17  billion  out of its over $100  billion  total  debt  is owed to the commercial 
banks. For these reasons, I believe that Sachs is right  to argue  in favor 
of selective rather  than  general  debt relief. 
The Sachs plan has two elements. The first is temporary  interest 
suspension for countries that have suffered  major  declines in real per 
capita income. How long the interest suspension would last would 
depend  upon  the depth  of the preceding  decline  in income.  An interesting 
historical precedent for interest suspension under adverse circum- 
stances, besides the Indonesian  case that Sachs cites, is the postwar 
loan granted  by the United States to the United Kingdom  in 1946.  The 
loan's  bisque  clause, which  allowed  for  interest  suspension,  was invoked 
a number  of times. 
The second element  of the Sachs plan  is the subordination  of existing 
debt  for all countries  that  have had  any fall  in real  per  capita  income  over 
a five-year  period. The same proposal  was advanced  in the very early 
stages of the debt crisis by Jack Guttentag and Richard Herring.2 
Unfortunately  it got little attention,  perhaps  because  it was coupled  with 
a number of other proposals, notably for the securitization  of bank 
credit, that most of us did not feel were terribly  necessary or helpful  at 
that time. In any event, the more important  proposal  for subordination 
of existing debt did not get the discussion that it deserved. It should 
receive such attention  now. 
One major  question  that  is not addressed  by Sachs is whether  official 
bilateral  creditors  and  multilateral  development  banks  should  be treated 
the same as commercial  banks. There are serious arguments  against 
doing  so, particularly  in the case of the multilateral  development  banks. 
On the other  hand, one has to recognize  that if one does not extend the 
treatment  to those forms of debt as well, then the benefits to most of 
Sub-Saharan  Africa are going to be minor. Their  problems  simply will 
not be addressed, because most of their debt is to the official sector 
rather  than  to the commercial  banks. 
How does the Sachs plan rate on the standard  list of objections to 
2.  Jack M.  Guttentag and Richard J.  Herring,  The Current Crisis in International 
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debt relief? The first objection is that debt relief could risk a financial 
crisis. The argument  here is typically that if enough relief is offered to 
address  the problems  of countries  like Zambia  and Bolivia, and this is 
then generalized  to all debtor countries, that this will jeopardize the 
continued solvency of the major  commercial  banks. The answer is to 
make relief convincingly selective, to restrict it to the countries that 
really need it. If only interest suspension  and not subordination  would 
damage  the financial  position of the banks, as Sachs believes, then the 
Sachs plan is safe on this score. If, on the other hand, subordination  of 
existing debt would have an adverse impact on the value of existing 
debt, the matter  is not clear. If Sachs is right  in arguing  that new money 
will go voluntarily  after subordination  and that the new money will 
improve  the possibility  of countries  developing  new export  sectors, then 
countries  will actually  be in a better position to repay the original  debt 
than they otherwise would have been. Thus it could be that Brazil's 
existing debt will go up from, say, 75 percent to 80 percent on the free 
market  when the existing debt is subordinated.  I am not at all sure that 
would  happen,  so there  are some risks, though  I think  they are probably 
acceptable. 
A second objection  is that  debt relief means a loss of access to future 
credit. The critical  question here is the sign of the partial  derivative  of 
future  credit  availability  with  respect  to current  debt  relief.  The  historical 
record is surely not as clear on this issue as Sachs claims. Indeed, I 
would have thought this is something  that is going to differ from one 
country  to another.  I cannot, for example, believe that  Brazil  is going  to 
improve  its access to future  credit  by struggling  to get relief  at this stage. 
On the other hand, neither  can I believe that Bolivia would not benefit 
in terms of its medium-term  borrowing  capability  by having the slate 
wiped  clean. 
A third  objection  concerns  moral  hazard.  Sachs's  intention  in  choosing 
a fall in per capita income as the criterion  for debt relief is to avoid 
countries  taking  deliberate  steps to worsen their economies in order  to 
qualify  for relief. There is nevertheless some danger  in a literal imple- 
mentation  of the Sachs plan, since by showing a 25 percent  loss of per 
capita  income instead of 24 percent a country  would be entitled to ten 
years'  interest  suspension  instead  of five. Of course a country  would be 
unlikely  to create  a recession to gain  relief, but it would surely  fiddle  its 
statistics. To minimize the problem one would need to smooth the 
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Fourth, there is the equity question. Restriction of the benefits to 
countries  that have had a fall in per capita income attempts  to address 
that issue, but there nevertheless remain  two problems. One involves 
the moral  obligation  to compensate  those countries  that  did not borrow. 
Some countries never borrowed  anything  except International  Devel- 
opment  Association  money  because they knew they were not capable  of 
servicing  anything  else: Rwanda  is an example. The second problem  is 
that Sachs's criterion-a fall in per capita  income-could  provide  relief 
to some countries  whose claims, taking  into account  the bounty  of their 
natural  endowment,  the value of their citizens' external  assets, and the 
level of per capita income, are strictly marginal.  Both Argentina  and 
Venezuela  would qualify  for relief  under  his criterion. 
A fifth possible problem is that wiping the slate clean reduces the 
incentive to adopt reform measures. However, as Sachs notes, one 
could avoid making  this a once-for-all  action, but rather  impose condi- 
tionality  over a series of years. 
Finally, there is the legal problem. Can the commercial  banks be 
persuaded  to abandon  their claims, or will it be necessary to write new 
laws in all of the creditor  countries  to enable some authority  to direct 
the banks  to reduce  their  claims?  I agree  with Sachs in his argument  that 
too much has been made of this objection. There is, incidentally,  one 
way in which the official  sector could sanction  debt relief and leave the 
commercial  banks little choice but to acquiesce. It could exploit the 
IMF's authority  to approve  exchange  controls. The Fund could, if it so 
wished, agree to a member  debtor  country  imposing  exchange controls 
that prohibited residents, including the public sector, from making 
interest payments to banks abroad. The controls would give legal 
authority  for the suspension  of interest  payments  to banks  located in the 
creditor  countries,  except Switzerland.  It would not, however, prevent 
the banks  treating  the unpaid  interest  as arrears;  that  would  require  legal 
action. 
Last December I advanced a proposal for selective debt relief that 
was intended  to enable the countries  in the most desperate  situation  to 
get substantial  relief, without thereby opening the floodgates so that 
Brazil and Mexico also qualified.3  My proposal  was to create an inter- 
3. John  Williamson,  "On  the Question  of Debt Relief," appendix  to the Statement  of 
The Roundtable on Money and Finance  (Islamabad: North South Roundtable, December 
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national  tribunal  that  would  be empowered  to restructure  debt, with the 
possibility  of granting  substantial  relief  where  there  existed  a conjunction 
of circumstances.  I suggested  that  perhaps  five out of the following  eight 
circumstances  would  be needed  to qualify  a country  for relief: 
-the  occurrence  of exogenous shocks that had led to a substantial 
unexpected  increase  in the burden  of debt service; 
-low  per capita  income; 
-the  lack of a threat  to international  financial  stability; 
-little  prospect of the country being able to resume debt service 
without  an unacceptable  welfare  cost; 
-poor  use made of the proceeds of the loan (this and the following 
criterion  are  intended  to improve  the incentives  confronting  the lenders, 
to ensure  that  in the future  they undertake  proper  monitoring); 
-irresponsible  lending, in the sense of failing to make a serious 
assessment of the probability  that the borrower  will be in a position to 
service its debts; 
-doubtful  legitimacy  of the government  that contracted  the loan; 
-refusal  of the lenders to extend further loans ih support of an 
internationally  agreed  adjustment  program. 
Sachs's paper  inspires  me to add  two further  criteria: 
-a  decline in per capita  income; 
-a  presumption  that  economic  recovery  is being  impeded  by the debt 
overhang. 
Sachs also persuades me that any debt relief tribunal  should usually 
include  the subordination  of old debt in its debt restructuring  award. 
I am  not convinced  that Sachs's criterion  of a fall  in per capita  income 
succeeds in doing what I argued  explicitly no single one of my criteria 
could hope to accomplish-namely,  provide a remotely satisfactory 
basis for discriminating  between cases that do and do not merit debt 
relief. For that, one needs a series of criteria  and a tribunal  capable of 
combining  them on a case-by-case basis. The only reason I can see for 
preferring  Sachs's approach  is the institutional  and  legal  complexities  of 
launching  an international  tribunal  empowered  to impose modifications 
in the terms  of loan contracts  on the lenders. I recognize  that  that  reason 
may in the event prove decisive, since the need for selective debt relief 
is urgent.  In any event, I am  pleased  that  discussion  is beginning  to focus 
on the design of criteria  and mechanisms  for selective debt relief and 
escape from the dead end of advocating  or criticizing  generalized  debt 
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General  Discussion 
Several participants  agreed  with Sachs that some form of debt relief 
is appropriate.  Stanley  Fischer  noted  that  the American  banks  continued 
to make large loans to the Latin American  countries  in 1980  and 1981, 
after it had become clear that repayment might be difficult. In his 
assessment, the banks' role in creating  the debt crisis means that they 
should  bear  part  of the costs of resolving  it. Charles  Holt suggested  that 
Fischer's characterization  of the banks' role may be somewhat too 
simple;  in Holt's view, the governments  of the industrialized  countries, 
unwilling  to offer direct assistance to the developing countries  hurt  by 
the 1979  OPEC  price  increases,  put  pressure  on the banks  to make  loans. 
Holt speculated  that  avoiding  future  debt  crises may  require  the creation 
of some mechanism  for worldwide  fiscal policy coordination.  Matthew 
Shapiro suggested that debt relief would help not only the debtor 
countries  but also the United States, in that relief would likely enable 
the Latin American  countries  to increase their imports  of U.S. capital 
goods. 
William  Cline argued that the debt situation was not as dismal as 
Sachs depicted  it. Falling  interest  rates  have reduced  interest  payments 
on the debt in most countries. For example, Brazil's interest-to-export 
ratio has fallen from a peak of 52 percent to 31 percent. The aggregate 
interest-to-export  ratio  has not improved  only because falling  oil prices 
have hurt  Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela. Moreover, expe- 
rience suggests  that  nominal  dollar  commodity  prices should  eventually 
rise as a consequence of the recent fall in the real value of the dollar. 
Such a rise should  help several  of the debtor  countries. 
Cline also suggested that Sachs's argument  for debt relief does not 
adequately  come to grips  with  the negative  impact  that  relief  would  have 
on access to credit  markets  for  the countries  accepting  it. Cline  attributed 
Mexico's and Brazil's strenuous  efforts to avoid repudiating  their debt 
to their concern  about  future  creditworthiness.  Peter Kenen countered 
that Mexico and Brazil were probably  more concerned about possible 
retaliation,  in the form of either trade sanctions or other nonfinancial 
sanctions. He also questioned  whether  the LDC government  officials' 
actions reflect  any rational  calculus  regarding  their  countries'  interests. 
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partnership  with their industrialized-country  counterparts  in a mutual 
effort  to preserve  the stability  of the world  financial  system. 
On Sachs's specific relief proposal, Robert Hall argued strongly 
against  following  a formula  in granting  debt  relief. One reason  not to use 
a formula  is that the national income accounts kept by many of the 
debtor  countries  are simply  not believable. A more fundamental  objec- 
tion, Hall continued,  is that  use of a formula  would  create  incentives  for 
poor economic performance.  Hall preferred  a strategy of tough talk, 
with  relief  to be negotiated  as necessary  on a case-by-case  basis. Fischer 
suggested  that, in fact, the United States is currently  doing  exactly what 
Hall recommends.  He saw the recent Mexican  plan as a good example 
of a fairly  generous  and  imaginative  package.  Sachs questioned  whether 
such an approach  is really  feasible over the long haul;  tough  talk would 
lose its credibility  because any negotiated  relief would become public 
knowledge. 
Kenen  suggested  that  it might  be less costly to help  Mexico and  Brazil 
today, rather  than  waiting  a year or two and taking  the risk that current 
restrictive  policies imposed  by the lenders  will lead to large  cumulative 
declines in GNP that require  more substantial  relief. Kenen also sug- 
gested graduating  the amount  of relief according  to the severity of each 
country's  problems,  but spreading  all relief over a uniformly  long time 
period.  Sachs's plan  would  grant  some countries  relief  over a very short 
period. Spreading  all relief over, say, ten years would  provide  leverage 
for assuring that the debtor countries followed through on whatever 
actions  they undertook  as a condition  for receiving  relief. 
Kenen went on to question the wisdom of making  new loans to the 
debtor  countries  at the same  time  that  relief  is being  granted  on old loans. 
Making  new loans to tide these countries  over a bad patch made sense 
when the problem  appeared  to be a short-term  one. It makes less sense 
now that it is clear that a lengthy adjustment  lies ahead. Hall felt that 
some new debt might  be a good idea, though  he proposed  a requirement 
that  all new lending  be to private  companies  rather  than  to governments. 
But  Sachs  pointed  out  that  public  spending  on roads,  dams,  power  plants, 
health  care, and so on, is complementary  to private  investment. 
Kenen noted that subordination  of old debt to new would  be difficult 
both  because the banks  would be unwilling  to agree to any scheme that 
subordinated  their claims and because the involvement  of parties  from 
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debt subordination.  He also questioned  whether such a scheme would 
actually  lead to significantly  increased  loan inflows. 
Cline contended that both the Bradley plan and the Sachs plan 
expected too much from the banks. Because the banks are highly 
leveraged,  any relief would have a large  adverse effect on bank  capital. 
He concluded that any debt relief plan must involve public money as 
well as bank  money. 
Benjamin  Friedman  argued  that any plan for dealing with the debt 
problem  should  also provide  for bank  write-downs  of outstanding  LDC 
debt. Such  an approach  might  well force some banks  to raise  new capital 
at  prices  they  found  unattractive,  but  it would  be preferable  to the  present 
policy that implicitly  ignores the reduced value of bank portfolios  and 
thus risks  bigger  problems  in the future. 